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Abstract: 
This paper firstly clarifies the conceptual ideas of trust, openness and responsiveness within the 
scope of public administration. Secondly it introduces the features of the new media like 
microblog in China, and the background of Tianjin municipal government’s utilization of new 
media tools. Then, four recent typical highly concerned events in Tianjin would be analyzed 
and discussed. The four cases are: heavy rainstorm in Tianjin in 2012; big fire of a shopping 
mall in rural Tianjin in 2012; restriction of purchase and utilization of private vehicles in 2013; 
arrest of a high-ranked official of Tianjin in 2014. By using statistical tools, this paper conducts 
the analysis on Tianjin government’s openness and responsiveness regarding the selected cases 
in official microblogs. There are three periods throughout the process of Tianjin government’s 
exploration to improve its level of trust by utilizing microblog. In the initial stage, Tianjin 
government abandoned the traditional one-way mode of publishing official information, and 
instead explored to actively interact with public through its official microblog to enhance its 
level of trust. However, in the second phase, when some sensitive events emerge or 
controversial policies being implemented, the government’s way of dealing with the public 
opinion tended to become backward, which include the restrictive opening of information and 
avoidant response to the public inquiries, causing its level of trust started to decline. At the last 
phase, as government’s one-way mode of publishing short and vague information without any 
response and interaction in microblog becoming increasingly serious, the impact of Tianjin 
government and its major constituting departments’ official microblogs have been getting weak 
to a considerable degree. The situation of other major municipalities’ governments is found to 
be similar. In other words, Chinese local government’s exploration to enhance their level of 
trust by utilizing new media tools ends in failure.             
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is considered that there is a significant correlation between the trust in government and the 
openness as well as responsiveness of the government. The trust in government is a public 
value judgment based on the government’s public administration and service. In nature, it is the 
public evaluation and judgment on the value dimensions reflected in the government’s public 
policy formulation and implementation as well as public affairs management, such as fairness, 
justice, efficiency and accountability. The trust in government is the modern government’s 
foundation to win popular support, to obtain ruling legitimacy as well as to perform the public 
administration and service function; it also should be the value demands that open and 
responsive government’s pursue. 1 The responsiveness within the scope of public administration 
refers to that the public policy formulated by the political system should reflect the needs of the 
society or the social expectations for government agencies. The government becomes difficult 
to control the position and tendency of the public opinion due to the features of the new media.2    
With the rapid development of the internet and the rapid spread of the online media such as 
microblog, the traditional model of information dissemination has changed, and China has 
entered a new media era. Before the new media emerged, traditional media and public opinion 
are under the control of the totalitarian Chinese government, and thus the media’s oversight 
function has been limited to a considerable degree. Chinese government also tends to filter the 
facts and control the public opinion through leading and propaganda. However, in the new 
media era, the government has been difficult to monopolize the media discourse and control the 
public opinions, which have the decentralized and diversified characteristics. 3 The government 
would probably bring negative impacts on the credibility and trust in itself, if delivering 
information selectively or not timely in the new media era. Some local governments would like 
to guide and shape the public opinion by releasing information selectively or not timely, and it 
is possible to achieve success in traditional media era, rather than new media era.     
Weibo is the Twitter-like microblog based in China. Its full name is Sina Weibo, and it was 
formally launched in November 2009. According to the Weibo User Development Report, 
Weibo has approximately 167 million monthly active users and 76 daily active users by the end 
of September 2014. 4 According to the China Government Affairs Index Report 2014, which is 
jointly published by People’s Daily and Sina Weibo, there are approximately 130 thousand of 
officially certified government affairs weibo accounts, including 94 thousand of governmental 
agency weibo accounts and 3.6 thousand of public servants by the end of 2014.5    
Tianjin is one of the four municipalities directly under the Central Government in China. It has 
approximately 13 million of residents currently, and is the industrial and commercial center and 
the second largest metropolis of North China. There are 37 municipal level governmental 
agencies (including functional departments, offices, commissions and bureaus) as well as 15 
district and county level governmental agencies have official weibo accounts in Tianjin. 
Among them, the most important and high-leveled weibo account is considered to be “Tianjin 
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Release”, which is the official account of Tianjin Municipal Government Information Office. 
The account introduces itself as the prime platform and portal for the governance and public 
service of Tianjin, and aims to maintain the close ties with the masses. It started to tweet since 
November 2011, and is the earliest Tianjin governmental agency official weibo account; it has 
posted more than 20250 tweets (excluding the deleted tweets) by the end of 2014, at least four 
times more than that of any other Tianjin governmental agency weibo accounts. Moreover, it 
has 1.52 million followers (including the “zombie fans”), more than that of any other Tianjin 
governmental agency weibo accounts. Thus, this study takes the “Tianjin Release” as the major 
analysis object, and takes other accounts for reference. “Weibo Reach”, a professional 
microblog analysis tool that could analyze the number of views or exposure amounts as well as 
the participating users’ features of one tweet, will also be used in the study. 6  
2. CASE STUDIES 
The responses of Tianjin government’s official weibo account for four typical highly-concerned 
events in Tianjin municipal according to the chronological selection from 2012 to 2014 would 
be taken as case studies to be analyzed and discussed. The four cases are: the heavy rainstorm 
in Tianjin in 2012; big fire of the shopping mall in the rural area of Tianjin in 2012; the 
restriction of the purchase and utilization of private vehicles within urban Tianjin in 2013; the 
arrest of a high-ranked official of Tianjin in 2014.  
2.1. Big fire in rural Tianjin in 2012 
There was a big fire in a shopping mall of Ji County, a suburban area in Tianjin, on June 30th, 
2012. The official reports that the whole shopping mall was burnt down, and there were 10 
residents died and 16 residents injured in the fire7. However, the public strongly questioned the 
truth of the report. According to the witnesses, the real number of died and injured people were 
far more than that, and there even was a rumor claiming 378 people died and injured in the 
fire.7 Besides, the public dissatisfied the government’s response on the fire.  Tianjin 
government seemed to believe that it was still in the traditional media era, and it was enough to 
one-way publish short and vague information, even on the controversial events. There was 
neither further detailed explanations nor followed-up reports on the big fire. Tianjin Release’s 
coverage of the controversial issue was only 140 characters; and none of the official weibo 
accounts of other major related Tianjin’s government departments, such as Public Security 
Bureau, Fire Bureaus as well as Ji County Government, had reported or mentioned the big fire 
at all. 8 While at the same time, some mainstream media dad covered the fire event with more 
detailed information, follow-up reports and further questions, and caused much more 
widespread impact. The comparison of the tweets posted by Tianjin Release and some 
mainstream medias on the fire even on June 30th 2012, are presented in the figure 1. Moreover, 
the fire event happened at 15:00 June 30th, however, the government’s official weibo, Tianjin 
Release, did not post any relevant tweets until the next day at noon. While Tianjin Release had 
successively posted three tweets at 17:00, 19:00 and 20:00 on June 30th, and their main contents 
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are: kindergartens parties, transportation plans as well as weather, and of which the numbers of 
the forwarding, comment and exposure amount are little. This is a typical dealing style of the 
government in the traditional media era: it turns a blind eye to the public event, and turns a deaf 
ear to the public questioning.  
2.2. Heavy rainstorm in Tianjin in 2012 
Tianjin suffered more than 10 days of heavy rainstorm which is the most terrible one within the 
recent 50 years from July 21st to 1st August, 2012. 9 There are mainly three rounds of heavy 
rainstorm: the first round lasted from 21st to 22nd July, of which the average rainfall was 
98.6mm, and the maximum rainfall was 294.7mm; the second round lasted from 25th to 27th 
July, of which the maximum rainfall was 344.9mm; the third round lasted from 30st June to 1st 
August, the maximum rainfall was 102.8mm. 9 During the rainstorm, hundreds of vehicles were 
flooded in the downtown area, and about 45,700 citizens had to be transferred to safer places.  
From 21st July to 1st August 2012, “Tianjin Release” had posted 138 tweets, 51 of which were 
directly related or relevant to the heavy rainstorm or weather; by contrast, there was up to one 
tweet during the rest of July in the most time. The total number of the repost or forwarding of 
the 51 tweets was 3690, and the total number of the comments of them was 1098; both of the 
two indicators were more than the sum of the rest tweets in July 2012. The most influential 
tweet in the 51 tweets is the one issuing the orange rainstorm warning signal in 26th July, of 
which the number of views or exposure amounts was 21.4 million, and 71% of the participating 
users were with positive attitude and praised highly of the tweet’s positive role as well as the 
official account’s active responses. The data of the numbers, repost or forwarding and 
comments regarding the weather from 21st July to 1st August are presented in figure 2.  
The heavy rainstorm in Tianjin is the most influential event since Tianjin Municipality 
Government registered the weibo account in the end of 2011. During this phase, “Tianjin 
Release” had won a large number of followers and the highest degree of influence through not 
only publishing the information regarding the committed public sectors’ force and resources, 
the rainstorm and flood control measures, rescue measures and contingency plan; but also the 
timely posting useful information and tips regarding the abnormal weather as well as actively 
interacting with its followers. It no longer mechanically post information that every daily 
newspaper has; instead, the account had become an online communication tool, and made the 
residents feel that the government really cared about them. When people ask urgent questions 
or information in need, the account could always reply in time or response directly; the tweets it 
had posted became the evidence of self-transform. In other words, Tianjin Municipality 
Government had abandoned the traditional one-way mode of solely publishing short and brief 
official information, and instead pursued openness and responsiveness: it explored to actively 
publish detailed information and timely interact with the public through its official weibo 
account, in the expectation to enhance its level of trust. Since then, “Tianjin Release” started to 
keep posting tweets in this mode. Considering the positive effect, its transform seemed to be 
successful. According to the 2013 Development Report of China’s Rule of Law, the level of 
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trust of Tianjin Municipality Government had been significantly improved, and ranked among 
the top three in China’s provincial-level government ranking list of trust regarding the openness 
in 2012. 10   
2.3. The restriction of the purchase and utilization of private vehicles in urban 
Tianjin in 2013 and 2014 
Tianjin government formally announced the policy of restriction of the purchase and utilization 
of private vehicles on December 15th 2013. The “double restrictions” refer to that each resident 
living in the urban area of Tianjin can only purchase one car via license-plate lottery or license-
plate auction, and each car cannot be driven on road in one day of the week from 7:00 to 19:00 
according to the tail number of the license plate, in order to reduce the severe traffic load. 11 
This controversial policy makes Tianjin the third city limiting the purchase and utilization of 
private vehicles nationwide.  
Before the order was issued, Tianjin Release had posted a tweet asking the public opinions and 
testing the public response on September 9th. It tweeted that the possibility of restriction on the 
purchase and utilization of private vehicles is little, but the some experts claimed that the traffic 
congestion problem consistently challenge the overall living condition of the urban area of 
Tianjin, and it need further actions to converse the trend, such as to develop urban rail transit. 
The forwarding and comments of the that tweet were 51 and 25 respectively, and most 
comments supported the idea of developing rail, and some comments worried about that the 
aim of this tweet was only to let the public calm down and do not panic purchase the cars. 
There was no further information about that in the following 3 months. While Tianjin 
government suddenly issued the order to restricted the purchase and utilization of private 
vehicles at 19:00 of December 15th without warning, and enforced the order of restricting 
purchase the next day, and restricting utilization in March 2014. This controversial action made 
Tianjin the third city limiting the purchase and utilization of cars nationwide, and caught the 
public strong repercussion. However, Tianjin Release did not posted any tweets about that until 
4 days later, it only stated that the policy of restricting purchase and utilization of private 
vehicles is concerned by general residents, and further regulation would be made in the 
following days. There were 31 forwardings and 24 comments of that tweet, of which the 
majority complained and criticized that the “double restrictions policy” is unreasonable and 
would cause troubles and inconvenience of the public daily life. 12 Regarding on the restriction 
on the utilization of cars, Tianjin Release posted a tweet on February 28th, reminding the 
residents to pay attention to the tail numbers of their vehicle license-plate, as the policy of 
restriction would be implemented the next day. 13 There were 119 forwardings and 32 
comments of that tweet, and most of them complained and criticized that the policy was 
unreasonable and could cause a series of problems.      
The forwardings and comments of the tweets put forward several major questions. Firstly, 
when making such policy and decision, why did not first present the draft to the National 
People’s Congress and answer questions of National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s 
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Political Consultative Conference? Secondly, why did the government issue the order so 
quickly without leaving space and time for public debate? Thirdly, why did the government 
ignore the suggestions and opinions of academic scholars that consider it was inappropriate 
time to implement such policy? Fourthly, is it necessary to implement the “double restrictions” 
as the amount of vehicles of Tianjin is far less than that of Beijing and Shanghai, which were 
precedent cities to implement the restriction policy? Fifthly, how to make balance between the 
restriction policy and the national encouragement policy for new energy vehicles? Lastly, why 
did the official new media tool post the government decision so late? In other words, those 
questions are the touchstone for the openness and responsiveness for the government and its 
new media tool. The government owed the explanation to those questions, and the weibo 
became the platform for the government expound. However, its restricted responsiveness 
clarifies its little openness. Tianjin Release did not answer the most questions but one with 
regard to the new energy vehicles: it posted a tweet on March 11th 2014, three months after the 
double restrictions policy was issued, announcing that the residents who buy the new energy 
vehicles could get license-plate freely. It could hardly say that Tianjin Release ignored the 
feelings and demands of the public, as it kept posted tweets reminding the public the restricted 
tail number of vehicles daily from September 18th to October 12th 2014, lasting less than one 
months.   
It was regarded as a sign that the government had stepped backward to the traditional mode to a 
certain extent. The official weibo account postponed the controversial policy announcement 
avoided most questions from the public, reflected a avoidant feature. However, there shall be a 
certain degree of possibility that the government is exploring to the new media era, as the 
official weibo account still respond to the public and post warm prompt, though little and short, 
during this phase.   
2.4. The arrest of a high-ranked official of Tianjin in 2014 
In July 20th, Dr. Wu Changshun, the former Police Chief and Vice Chairman of CPPCC of 
Tianjin, was dismissed and under arrested and investigated for suspected seriously violations of 
laws. 14 Dr. Wu was one of the highest ranking official in China that was dismissed and arrested 
during national anti-corruption movement since 2013, and was one of the most controversial 
figure in Tianjin for his oppressive style and suspected collusion with the local interest groups. 
Dr. Wu was considered by some medias and critics that should have been arrested in 2007, 
when Song Pingshun, the former Secretary of Politic and Law Committee and Chairman of 
CPPCC of Tianjin, conducted suicide. Mr. Song was superior leader of Dr. Wu when alive, so 
when Mr. Song conducted suicide for suspected crimes, the public believed that Dr. Wu would 
be arrested soon. 15 Finally, Dr. Wu was dismissed, but after a really long period.       
As slow as the pace of Dr. was arrested, Tianjin Release surprisingly delayed posting the tweet 
about that information five days later, jointly with the information about the appointment of the 
new Police Chief. 16 There were 75 forwardings and 43 comments of that tweet, and the 
exposure amounts were 2.16 million; and most of the forwardings and comments questioned 
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Tianjin Release that why the information was posted so late, in addition to scold and expose the 
well known suspected crimes of Wu Changshun. Some comments directly asked why Dr. Wu 
was arrested so late rather than 2007, as his major suspected crimes were conducted before that 
time and was noticed by officials of the Ministry of Supervision when Mr. Song conducted 
suicide; some other comments pointed out that the man protected Dr. Wu was Zhou Yongkang, 
the former member of the Poliburo Standing Committee, and asked whether this arrest was a 
the current leaders’ assault for the political opponents.    
However, the government’s official weibo account did not only ignore all the questions and 
inquiries, but also blocked comments for that tweet. Tianjin Release closed the message board 
and comment section since July 27th 2014 for about several days, and even deleted most tweets 
relating to Dr. Wu. When it posted the tweet announcing Dr. Wu was formally under 
censorship of accreditation on February 13th 2015, the majority of the 38 forwardings and 21 
comments complained the action that Tianjin Release blocked comments and messages 
previously, and questioned why the relating interest groups and stakeholders were free from 
charged. The response of Tianjin Release was ignore all the inquiries and to block the 
comments since the afternoon of that day for another several days.   
The government was considered to go backward to the traditional media era, even worse. In the 
traditional media era, the government would just leave the comments and messages and ignore 
the public opinions; while concerning the arrest of Dr. Wu, the most concerned and hottest 
public event in the second-half of 2014, the government’ weibo account delayed the 
announcement, ignored the public inquiries, and even began to block comments and delete 
information. The openness and responsiveness were considered to be fading away. The public 
was probably aware of the tendency of the government’s media to go backward to the old mode, 
since the amount of exposure and concern for Tianjin Release had been declining dramatically, 
according to the figure analyzed.   
3. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION           
This study finds that there are four periods throughout the process of Tianjin government’s 
exploration to improve the level of trust by utilizing microblog. In the initial stage, Tianjin 
government regarded the weibo platform as an extension of the traditional media tool, and was 
reluctant to make changes. In the second stage, Tianjin government abandoned the traditional 
one-way mode of publishing official information, and instead explored to actively publish 
information and interact with the public through its official account at weibo, in the expectation 
to enhance its level of trust. During this phase, the level of trust of Tianjin government had 
been significantly improved, and ranked among the top three in China’s official ranking list of 
trust. However, in the third phase, when some sensitive events emerge or controversial policies 
being implemented, the government’s way of dealing with the public opinion and concern 
tended to become backward, which include the restrictive opening of information and avoidant 
response to the public inquiries; the government even delete some public comments in its 
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microblog in order to avoid the enhancement of the sensitivity, causing its level of trust started 
to decline in the public view to a certain level. At the last phase, as the government’s one-way 
mode of publishing short and vague information without any response and interaction in the 
microblog becoming increasingly serious, the impact (in terms of the numbers of forwarding or 
repost, comment as well as linkage clicks) of Tianjin government and its major constituting 
departments’ official microblog accounts have been getting weak to a considerable degree, and 
even there have been non comments and forwarding in the major governmental departments’ 
microblog accounts for several weeks, which shows that the lack of openness and 
responsiveness has been lowering the level of trust and concern of government in the public 
perspective.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. The comparison of the tweets posted by Tianjin Release and some mainstream 
medias on the fire even on June 30th 2012 
Accounts forwardings/ repost comments   exposure amounts 
Tianjin Release        71     75      1.6 million 
Caijing News        349     167     14.4 million 
Caixin News        481     102      4.9 million 
People’s Daily        214     363     20.9 million 
Sina News        1388     1479     140.9 million 
 
Figure 2. The numbers, repost or forwarding and comments regarding the weather from 21st 
July to 1st August 
Date  Numbers  Forwardings  Comments  Exposure amounts 
July 21st  4 266 80 2.7 million 
July 22nd  2 49 15 0.7 million 
July 23rd  2 49 12 0.7 million 
July 24th  3 71 20 1.3 million 
July 25th  5 418 97 4.6 million 
July 26th  13 1882 476 21.4 million 
July 27th  6 289 131 2.9 million 
July 28th  4 147 121 1.9 million 
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July 29th  3 79 34 1.4 million 
July 30th  3 242 60 2.8 million 
July 31st  2 90 16 1.5 million 
August 1st  4 108 36 1.8 million 
All 51 3690 1098 43.7 million 
 
